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SEGREGATION OF PASSENGERS ON COMMON CARRIERS ON BASIS OF RACE.

By J. R. RIcAR SoN
The practice of Motor Bus Carriers in southern sections of
our country to segregate passengers, on the basis of race as a
matter of right, is being challenged by actions in the state and
federal courts. In studying the circumstances of various cases,
one is led to the conclusion that the suits are part of a planned,
but not as yet well organized program, to break down various
racial barriers. A further conclusion that the movement is
closely tied in with a general civil rights agitation with its unfortunate attendant political aspects is inescapable. One finds it
practically impossible to discuss the law on this subject without
commenting on the broader phases so closely allied are they
found to be. It is not our intent to display the existence of any
prejudices, if such there be, nor to promulgate any propaganda
either pro or con. Yet one's thought must leave its indelible imprint on the written word, and an opinion, though erroneously
conceived, may lead to fruitful ends.
Our topic is one which is vitally alive and of immense interest to all as we seek to live together and demonstrate that ours
is the better way of life in a world that is, volunarily or not,
aligning itself in opposing camps for a showdown on the right of
democratic government to survive in what has not as yet reached
the proportions of a "shooting war"
On January 30, 1948 what is called a "discrimination case"'
by the trade was tried in the District Court of the United States
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexigton before the
Honorable H. Church Ford, Judge. The writer's general interest
in the principle involved was augmented by his having taken
part in the case, thereby culminating in further thought and
research, the results of which are submitted for consideration of
the layman and lawyer alike.
-LL.B., Umv. of Ky Formerly, Asst. Atty. Gen. of Ky., assigned
to Dept. of Highways. Address: 101 Victory Ave., Lexington, Ky.
'Ernest C. Preston, Jr. v Southeastern Greyhound Lines (No.
562-Civil-unreported at this writing).
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Preston, a resident of Roanoke, Virgina, and student at
Kentucky State College, a school maintained by the Commonwealth at Frankfort, Kentucky, for Negroes, purchased a bus
ticket from Frankfort to Roanoke, boarding the bus at Frankfort. He took a seat in the front portion of the bus, was asked by
the driver to move to the rear and, upon persistant refusal, was
removed by two city patrolmen.
This case had all the earmarks of a planned test ease, as
the passenger very calmly refused to take a rear seat, stating that
he had the right to sit anywhere on the bus by reason of a recent
United States Supreme Court decision. Cross examination
elicited the fact that he referred to the "Morgan Case" and that
it was part of the curriculum at Kentucky State College. Tins
case will receive detailed treatment hereinafter.
The petition apparently claimed federal jurisdiction on
diversity of citizenship rather than on violdtion of constitutional
guarantees against discrimination as applicable to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce. Allegations were to the
effect that the complainant took a seat provided by the company
for passengers and that he was wrongfully ejected therefrom in a
violent and forceful manner. Damage by reason of personal injury and delay in transportation was claimed.
The defendant produced and filed a certified copy of its
rules and regulations on file with the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The pertinent part as to seating is as follows
"The carrier reserves to itself full control and dis,

cretion as to seating of passengers and reserves the right
to change such seating at any time during the trip."

The rule as set out is published in the present effective
tariffs of the company and also appears in its timetables and
printed notices to the public posted in its stations. While the defendant produced transportation experts who testified as to the
reasonableness and necessity of segregating colored and white
passengers due to custom, usage, and tradition in the South, the
court did not submit to the jury the question of reasonableness
of the rule reserving the right to seat, ruling that the company
had the right to seat its passengers in view of the regulation
being on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission, thereby
having the force and effect of a statute. The only issue submitted
was whether or not more force was used than was reasonably
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necessary to remove the plaintiff upon his failure to take a designated seat. The proof on this point was preponderantly in favor
of the defendant, and the jury, for the defendant had filed its
motion for a jury trial, found accordingly
It cannot be successfully argued that a common carrier
should not have the right to seat its passengers. This certainly is
a reasonable rule. However, the question naturally arises as to
whether segregation by seating whites from the front and colored from the rear is a reasonable application of the right to
seat. This issue could well have been submitted to the jury Admittedly, a certain woman might not wish to sit next to a certain
man or one person might prefer not to sit next to one who had
been drinking intoxicants, or next to a restless child. When the
seating is based arbitrarily on color, the question of reasonableness is brought forcefully to the forefront. If at all, it must be
justified upon grounds of preserving the peace.
This case brings another point to one's attention, namely,
that in reality by reason of the Federal Judge's right to comment on the evidence before the case is submitted to the jury, the
court has the last and most effective argument. The court stated
that it was impressed by the fact that eight impartial witnesses
appeared from different cities and states for the defendant and
not one for the plaintiff. In equity it could have been pointed out
that there were no other colored passengers on the bus who possibly would have made witnesses, and that the plaintiff lacked
equal facilities for producing witnesses. Actually it seems the
plaintiff was not prejudiced as these comments did not change
the outcome which was quite evident from the proof adduced.
Before leaving this case, the writer desires to point out that
the plaintiff was represented by a young colored attorney, a
graduate of the University of Michigan College of Law, whose
court room manner was admirable and who showed no lack of
legal ability by reason of his color.
The Morgan case, 2 to which reference has heretofore been
made, and which seems to have aroused a flurry of suits of a like
nature, was one in which Irene Morgan, a colored woman, became
a passenger on a bus traveling from Gloucester County, Virgima, to Baltimore, Maryland. Consequently she was an inter"Morgan v Virgmia (Case 704, announced June 3, 1946), 90
L. Ed. 982, 66 Sup. Ct. 1050.
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state passenger and the bus company, in transporting her, was
engaged in interstate commerce.
In order to make room for a standing white passenger during the trip, the driver asked Miss Morgan to move to a seat m
the rear and this she declined to do. Thereupon the passenger
was arrested and later convicted under the Virginia Race Separation Act. 3 This act is worthy of some consideration and comment, as it is stringent and in some respects novel. It requires
all passenger motor vehicle carriers operating as common carriers to
"Separate the white and colored passengers in their
motor busses and set apart and designate a portion
thereof, or certain seats therein, to be occupied by white
passengers, and a portion thereof or certain seats therein
to be occupied by colored passengers."
The act prohibits any "difference or discrimination in the
quality or convenience of the accommodations provided for the
two races" It gives the driver full power to designate the seats
to be taken, makes him the judge of race when a passenger refuses to disclose same and constitutes each bus driver, while actively engaged in the operation of his bus, a special policeman
with all powers of a peace officer in enforcing the provisions of
the law. If a passenger refused to take a designated seat, he could
be ejected without refund on the ticket and neither the bus
company nor the driver was amenable to law in an action for
damages. A penalty of $50.00 to $250.00 was provided for each
offense upon conviction, and the driver was liable for a fine of
'5.00 to $25.00, upon failure to enforce the provisions of the act.
Aside from considerations of discrimination this act would
seem to place "due process" at a minimum. None has been found
that attempted to go quite so far with arbitrary provisions.
Having been fined under this law, Irene Morgan took au
appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 4 The lower
court was affirmed on the grounds that the act was a valid exercise of police power reserved to the state, this right outweighing whatever slight burden it might place on interstate commerce.
By successive steps the case reached the Supreme Court of
the United States, as shown, and in that court the validity of
Secs. 4097-z-4097-dd.
Morgan v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 24, 34 S.E. (2) 491 (1945).

'VIRGINIA CODE,
4
1.. J.-2

l
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provisions for segregation of white and colored passengers as discriminatory was not raised. The question before the court was
the contention that the Virgima statute was unconstitutional
when applied to an interstate passenger, because it thereby
created and imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce
and consequently was repugnant to the Federal Constitution
which grants to Congress the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. 5
In its decision the Supreme Court declared the Virgima law
unconstitutional and void on the above grounds. The only dissent was expressed in a written opinion by -Mr. Justice Burton
(formerly a United States senator from Ohio and the most recent addition to the court)
The court made it quite clear that it was not passing on a
regulation of the bus company itself, but rather upon a state
statute wleh attempted to regulate passenger traffic on busses
engaged in interstate commerce.
In the course of its decision the court expressly approved of
and relied on the case of Hall v DeCiur6 In the DeCuir case,
which was decided seventy years ago, a statute of the State of
Louisiana forbade any discrimination between or separation of
passengers on public carriers on account of race or color. A public carrier engaged in interstate traffic by steamboat, in pursuance of a custom and rule adopted by the carrier, required
that white and colored persons occupy separate decks of the
boat. It enforced this rule against a colored passenger m
Louisiana, with the result that the passenger invoked the state
statute as a basis for a successful suit for damages against the
carrier. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the
grounds that the state statute was an attempt to regulate interstate commerce and as such was unconstitutional.
The DeCuw case and the subject case involve the validity of
statutes of directly opposite effect in that the former forbade
segregation and the latter required it. The cases are of course
not inconsistent. On the contrary the older case is authority for
the case under consideration. If one wonders at a statute forbidding racial segregation in Louisiana note that the date shows the
case to involve a piece of reconstruction days legislation.
Constitution, clause 3, sec. 8, art. 1.
95 U.S. 485 (1877).
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As we understand the Morgan decision, in the light of the
DeCuzr case, they hold that the power to regulate interstate
commerce rests exclusively in Congress, even though it be true
that Congress has not exercised this power to its full extent and
has refrained from enacting legislation dealing with certain
phases of interstate commerce, and any state legislation interfering with such commerce or burdening in any degree is invalid
as an encroachment on a right entrusted to Congress though not
exercised through legislation.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in concurring, stated that the
DeCur case "is controlling" as it had on occasion been approvingly cited and never questioned. The justice also said.
"The imposition upon national systems of transportation of a crazy-quilt of state laws would operate to
burden commerce unreasonably."
To carriers it is highly significant that this most recent
decision so strongly relies on the DeC~ur case, for its effect is
that when a carrier is engaged in interstate commerce, mdividual states have no power or right to enact laws interfering
with the carrier's own regulations and that no valid law interfering with a carrier's regulations can be enacted except by
Congress.
Investigation discloses that in addition to Virginia the following states have segregation statutes
Tennessee
Alabama
Georgia
Florida
South Carolina
Mississippi
Texas
North Carolina
Arkansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
Kentucky (trains only)
The following named states have anti-segregation statutes.
California
Michigan
Colorado
Minnesota
Connecticut
Nebraska
Illinois
New Jersey
Indiana
New York
Iowa
Ohio
Kansas
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Washington
Wisconsin
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It can readily be seen that where interstate commerce is mevolved the decision in the Morgan case casts a cloud on the validity of all these statutes, whether requiring or prohibiting
segregation.
Speaking for the court in the DeCur case, Mr. Chief Justice
Waite said
"Inaction by congress is equivalent to a declaration
that interstate commerce shall remain free and untrammeled. Applying that principle to this case, congressional inaction left Benson, the carrier, at liberty to
adopt such reasonable rules and regulations for disposition of passengers upon his boat, while pursuing her
voyage within Louisiana or without, as seemed to m
most for the interest of all concerned."
In the opinion it was pointed out that a steamer carrying
passengers "interstate" may have separate cabins and dimng
rooms for white and colored passengers for the plain reason that
Congress has not prohibited it. Steamers carrying for hire are
bound, if they have suitable accommodations, to take all who apply for passage, unless there is reasonable objection to the conduct, or character of the applicant. And the right to passage is
subject to reasonable regulations as the proprietors may prescribe.
Corresponding views are expressed by the Supreme Court
of Mfichigan in an analogous case,7 wherein the distinction between the right of an applicant to be admitted on board and his
claim of right to dictate what part of the vessel he shall occupy
is clearly drawn. The high degree of care required of a carrier
for the safety of its passengers carries with it the commensurate
right it is said to control odcupation of accommodations.
In Railroad Company v Miless the court held that it is not
an unreasonable regulation to seat passengers so as to preserve
order and decorum and to prevent contacts and collisions arising
from natural or well known customary repugnances which are
likely to breed disturbances where white and colored passengers
are huddled together without their consent.
Another old federal case 9 upheld distinctions between the
races based upon the "established wages, customs and traditions
7

Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520 (1888).

855 Pa. 209 (1867)
8

Plersy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 540 (1895).
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of the people" and the "promotion of their comfort and preser
vation of public peace and good order"
In Chiles v C. & 0 Railway Company,'0 a Negro interstate
passenger with a ticket from Washington, D. C., to Lexington,
Kentucky, sued the railroad for excluding him from a car set
apart for -white passengers and requiring him to occupy a car
for colored only, when the tram crossed into Kentucky from
West Virginia at Ashland, Kentucky
The Supreme Court commented on the Kentucky Statute"
requiring railroads to furnish separate coaches for Wvhite and
colored passengers but put it out of consideration as having no
application to interstate trains, as the defendant rested its defense not on the statute but its rules and regulations (see footnotes)
The court said we must bear in mind that we are not dealing
with a statute which seeks to regulate interstate commerce beyond its powers to do so but rather a private person, to wit the
railroad company and its rules and regulations. The court continued to the effect that regulations which are induced by the
community for wluch they are made and upon which they oper
ate cannot be said to be unreasonable.
It is an obvious observation that segregation by railroads is
a much more complicated and burdensome thing than by motor
busses when one considers that an extra car and even an extra
pullman might become necessary for one colored passenger in
order to maintain equal and like accommodation. Should the
railroad choose not to adopt rules in accord and to rely on the
statute, it would be held an undue burden on commerce.
In the section on carriers in American Jurisprudence,12 it
is set out that
"In general, those rules and regulations of the carriers are deemed reasonable which are necessary to

enable such carrier to perform the duties it has undertaken, to secure to itself its just rights and to conserve
the safety, convenience and comfort of its passengers."
10125 Ky. 299, 101 S.W

386 (1909), affirmed in 218 U.S. 71

(1910).

nKY. R. S. 276.440. On Sept. 23, 1946, the U .S.Court of Appeals

for District of Columbia, m case of Matthews et al. v Southern Railway, 157 F (2) 609, held that the Morgan case was applicable to tram
bus.
travel as well as motor
1020.
2 10

Am. Juis.
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Again in ELLIOTT on RAILROADS'

3

we find the following

"Rules and regulations m regard to separate cars for
ladies and their escorts or providing for the segregation of white from colored passengers have also been
upheld as reasonable when equal accommodations are
offered to all."
In another Kentucky case'" the direct question at issue was
not segregation but the right of the bus company to limit the
number of passengers to its seating capacity The plaintiff, a
colored woman, was refused transportation because no seat was

available.
In an opinion by Judge Richardson the court said.
"In the discharge of its duties as a public carrier,
a bus company must use their conveyances and busses
set apart by it for that purpose, for the transaction of
passengers without favor or discrimination, to all persons, offering themselves for transportation, who pay
or are willing to pay the customary charges, unless such
person is objectionable because of contagious disease,
abnormal condition or due to bad, dissolute or doubtful
character."
The court continued with the observation that a common
carrier has the right, in the absence of statute, to prescribe rules
and regulations for the separation of white and colored passengers, giving equal and like protection and accommodations to
both. This last is only dicta as the question of segregation was
not an issue.
We believe it a sound conclusion that a carrier, independently of any statute, has a legal right to make reasonable rules
for the separation of passengers belonging to different races,
provided reasonable conditions of equality of accommodations
are observed. This proposition has been sustained by various
state and federal court decisions as shown.
There has been a considerable lapse in time as to litigation
on segregation cases and the current decisions of necessity refer
to very old cases. Aside from considerations of state statutes and
interstate commerce which are mainly in issue now, there are
other factors which will be discussed later as will "reasonable"
as applied to transportation rules.
One will scarcely dispute the right of a motor bus company
to operate on the same schedules two identical busses, the one for

"Vol. 1, Sec. 200.
"Brumfield v. Con. Coach Corp., 240. Ky 1, 40 S.W
(1931).

(2) 356
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white and the other for colored, nor the right of a railway to
operate duplicate coaches, dining cars and pullmans. We would
then have equal and like accommodations, but with resultant
economic ruin.
Certainly transportation officials did not wish this problem
on themselves. It is an additional and severe headache to be met
in a business that has its quota. We cannot conceive of a bus or
train company official sitting in his office and carrying his prejudices into the business to the extent that the company's net
return is lessened. Certainly such official has no personal desire
to enforce segregation. He is motivated by sound business policies, attempting to have satisfied customers and increased
revenues.
It cannot be denied that carriers serving the southern part
of the United States must meet and deal with white prejudices
which cannot be disregarded.
Rightly or wrongly as the case may be, there are reasons
for these prejudices. No one will argue that a different situation
does not exist in the South due to population percentages of the
races.
In the United States there is a population of 131,666,275.
Of this number 12,865,518 are colored. 15 Of this number a total
of 8,111,645 or approximately 66-2/3% are residents of eleven
southern states with a total white population of 24,837,798.
Alabama and Georgia have a population which is one-third
Negro. Forty per cent (40%) of Louisiana's population is Negro,
as is that of South Carolina, while Mississippi's is 50%. New
York state has 571,221 Negroes within its boundaries, yet this is
only 4% of the total. Other percentages of colored'population are
Pennsylvania 5%, California 2%, Ohio 5% and Illinois 4%.
The colored population of Wisconsin and Tinnesota is in each
instance less than 1%. Seven states, namely, Idaho, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont and
Wyoming each have less than 1,000 Negroes as a part of their
population.
These figures are the factual basis for the existence of real
problem wherein the white population of the South seek tor maintain dominance in their economic, political and social structures.

11U.S.

Census 1940 (all figures and percentages used).
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The writer knows from first hand information that motor
bus companies serving the South have fought and continue to
fight to meet the situation from their angle and handle it with
the greatest justice possible to all.
Drivers are instructed to bear in mind that it is the company's duty to handle all passengers without regard to nationality or color, even though the company has the right, and in all
its publications notifies the passengers that it has the right, to
seat them. It is emphasized that it is essential that there be no
discrimiiation of any kind against any passenger, whether white
or .colored, and that all seats be substantially equal in comfort
and convenience, being not only a requirement of law but of common sense.
It is pointed out to drivers that the accomplishment of the
duty to assure the comfort, pleasure, congeniality, security and
safety of all passengers and to preserve the public peace and
good order depends primarily upon courtesy, tact and common
sense exercised by drivers in handling the seating of passengers.
It is further brought out that the motor bus is, in fact, a
large automobile with close, personal contacts necessary to such
a vehicle. Cognizance is taken of "customs, usages and traditions" in the South as to commingling of the races. At the same
time the fact is not ignored that a substantial part of the company's revenue comes from colored patrons. Force is prohibiteQ
on the part of the driver while the advantages of reasoning and
peaceful persuasion are shown to be desirable in seating
passengers.
Another interesting and very recent case on the subject was
tried before Judge John Paul in the District Court of the United
States for the Western District of Virginia at Roanoke.( The
decision in the case was announced on December 30, 1947 The
Simmons case, unlike the Morgan case, did not involve a statute
of Virginia, such differentiation having caused some confusion
in the minds of the public, particularly among many Negroes as
the court pointed out.
As to the facts briefly, the plaintiff, a Negro minister and
resident of Roanoke, Virgnia, purchased a bus ticket to Salisbury, North Carolina, to attend the annual synod of his church.
He took a seat in the forward part of the bus and was shortly
' 6 Simmons.v Atlantic Greyhound Co., 75 F Supp. 166 (1947).
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asked by the driver to move to the rear. This he refused to do
and, after a discussion with the driver and station manager, lef"
the terminal without accepting a refund.
The plaintiff alleged he was inconvenienced, delayed and
missed various church meetings. By this action the plaintiff
sought to establiph the right to be free of any compulsion in regard to a choice of seats on defendant's bus where that compulsion is based solely on the plaintiff's race.
The question of jurisdiction in this case is of interest and
merits discussion. The district courts of the United States are
courts of limited jurisdiction. Their original jurisdiction is
17
fixed by section 24 of the Judicial Code.
The plaintiff and defendant were both residents of the
State of Virginia, hence it seems that the following sub-sectional
provisions were applicable as to jurisdiction.
"(1) United States as plaintiff:

Civil suits at com-

mon law or in equity-of all suits of a civil nature-

where the matter in controversy-arises under the con-

stitution or laws of the United States.
(8) Suits for violation of interstate commerce laws
-of

all suits and proceedings arising under any laws

regulating commerce.
(14) Suits to redress deprivation of civil rights-of
all suits at law or in equity authorized by law to be
brought by any person to redress the deprivation under
color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom

or usage, of any state of any right, privilege or im-

munity secured by the constitution of the United States,
or of any rights secured by any law of the United States

providing for equal rights of citizens of the United
States or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States."
The plaintiff did not allege violati~n of any interstate commerce law, and it has been determined that at the pre-trial conference he expressly disclaimed any intention to rely on subsection (8) above quoted.
In line with such disclaimer it is admitted that any claim of
discrimination in treatment of passengers must first be passed
upon by the Interstate Commerce Comnssion.18 This rule in the
case arising in Texas involves the reasonableness of freight
rates but is considered -the leading case on the general subject
"728 U.S.C.A. Sec. 41.
" Texas & P Ry. Co. v Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 51
L. Ed. 553, 27 Sup. Ct. 350 (1907)
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of discrimination in allocation of coal cars. 19 Mitchell v. U S.20
states the rule on discrimination m accommodations to passengers.
It seems very soundly argued by counsel for the defendant
that in order to show jurisdiction the plaintiff must rely on
subsections (1) and (14) of section 41 of the Judicial Code above
set out. Subsection (14) was obviously inserted in the act to
provide a federal remedy for violation of the so-called civil
liberties act 2l as follows
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any state or
territory subjects or causes to be subjected any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured by the constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity or other proper proceedings for redress."
For the purpose of this case, it is apparent that subsection
(1) of the Judicial Code is no broader in general terms than is
subsection (14), consequently it was argued that plaintiff's
cause of action rests on whether or not his civil rights have been
involved.
The plaintiff, quite naturally it seems, contended very
vigorously that the defendant was doing by authority of a regulation that which the Supreme Court in the Morgan case, supra
had held could not be done under state statute. This is in a manner of speaking true, yet it has been shown that this argument
would be unavailing.
The defendant on its part contended that as a matter of
fact its driver was acting under a company regulation and not
the Virginia Statute and as a matter of law could not have been
acting under the authority of the statute for racial segregation
because, prior to such occurrence complained of, the Supreme
Court had finally held the statute unconstitutional and void and
2 2
further not applicable to interstate commerce.
The court in finding for the defendant said that the defendant was entitled to a directed verdict, holding that the plaintiff
"See also Morrisdale Coal Co. v Penn. Ry. Co., 230 U. S. 304,

57 L. Ed. 1494, 33 Sup. Ct. 938 (1913)
-'313 U. S. 80, 85 L. Ed. 1201, 61 Sup. Ct. 873 (1941).
"8 U.S.C.A. Sec. 43.
'McCabe v. A. T. & S. F Ry Co., 235 U.S. 151, 59 L.Ed. 169, 35
Sup. Ct. 69 (1914).
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showed no invasion of rights guaranteed by the "Civil Rights
Act" or the Fourteenth Amendment, the pertinent part of which
is as follows.
"
no state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
"
the United States
The court stated as follows.
"The Supreme Court has consistently held that there
is no infraction of the Fourteenth Amendment by
a requirement for separate accommodations for white
and colored persons on public carriers so long as the accommodations are equal."
The court further held in line with other decisions that the
power to regulate interstate commerce rested with Congress. In
commenting on plaintiff's argument that defendant sought to do
by regulation that which had been held could not be done under
a state law, the court said this argument missed the point,.that
it failed to recognize the distinction between the action of a state
in attempting to regulate the business of a carrier in respect to
matters which are the sole concern of Congress, and the right of
the carrier to operate its own business subject to such regulations
as Congress may impose.
Considerable mention has been made of carriers' right to
make regulations. By the Motor Carriers Act of 1935,23 the
regulation of motor carriers engaged in interstate commerce
was vested in the Interstate Commerce Commission.
By section 216 (A) of the act it is made the duty of such
carriers to "establish just and reasonable regulations and practices relating to rates, fares and charges, and to the issuance
and form of tickets, the carrying of baggage and facilities for
transportation" Carriers are required to file with the Commission and to keep open to public inspection "tariffs showing all
rates, fares and charges for transportation and all services in
connection therewith, of passengers or property "
From the above act and by virtue of authority cited in the
Abilene Oil Company case, supra it is shown that the proper
procedure to attack an interstate carrier's regulations on any
ground is by original action in form of hearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission. The matter could then by proper
-149 STAT. 543, 49 U.S. C. A. 301 et seq.
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appeal therefrom be adjudicated by ultimate authority of the
courts.
Due to dicta in recent cases and adverse decisions therein
there seems little room for doubt that such action will be taken.
We accept the broad proposition that the right to seat passengers is a reasonable rule and right of the carrier. As previously set out earlier in this article, we cannot but wonder if
seating of white persons from the front and colored from the
rear will be held to constitute an arbitrary exercise of that right.
It may well be that proof before the Commission will show that
such seating is reasonably necessary in the South, while the reverse is true in the North. A suggestion is submitted that carriers
to which the problem is relevant should conduct impartial surveys to accurately determine what portion of the public they
serve actually desires segregation of the races.
The above expressed doubt that the reasonableness of segregation will be upheld is expressed with full knowledge of a case
recently decided in the sixth judicial circuit by a three judge
court 2 4 wherein there is an examination of the rule (sdem pp.
912-914) with the court reaching the conclusion that
"It therefore being clear that racial segregation of

interstate passengers is not per se forbidden by the Con-

stitution, the Interstate Commerce Act or any other act
of Congress, we turn

"

If racial segregation were a violation per se, it would in
effect mean that a colored person is guaranteed the right to sit
with a white person on an interstate carrier. No one should attempt to maintain such an absurd proposition. It is maintained
however that a colored person has that right if it is required m
the exercise of "like and equal accommodations" The question
will eventually be raised as to whether the rear of a bus meets
such provisions. The right to equal and like accommodations
should not be confused as a right to commingle as such.
It must be borne in mind that the Morgan case prohibits
even a slight burden on interstate commerce and the law which
resulted in the necessity for a passenger to change seats at a
state line was such burden. When and if the Interstate Commerce
Commission has the segregation rule before it, due consideration
I4Henderson v U.S., 63 F Supp. 906 (1945).
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must and will be given the question from the angle of constituting an unnecessary burden.
As stated at the outset in this article, these segregation cases,
which have recently been and are being litigated in various jurisdictions, seem definitely to have been inspired, at least in part,
by President Truman's civil rights program with its political
coloration, the "Southern Revolt" This program including antipoll tax legislation, anti-lynching and the Fair Employment
Practices Commission would undoubtedly be looked upon with
less suspicion, if not more favor, were it not for the fact that the
proponents seek to woo votes in the process.
It has been well said that morals cannot be legislated into
the hearts and souls of the people. It appears as equal a truism
that social equality and justice cannot be had by legislation. It
must be an awakening or consciousness that comes from within
voluntarily, but perhaps with proper stimulation. Organizations
that publish "handouts" or "dodgers" 2 5 advismg colored per
sons that they do not have to ride "Jim Crow" do not to our
mind add anything of substance to a problem that needs a sane,
orderly and dignified approach to a solution.
Possibly this awakening may partially come about by a
realization of the cost of segregation. Can we in a southern economy, admittedly none too sound, afford the "luxury" of segregation? It is probable that the reader noted that Ernest C.
Preston was a student at Kentucky State College without giving
consideration to the fact that this was a separate physical plant
with separate instructors maintained at an additional cost by
the taxpayers. The same is true throughout the South, along with
the maintenance of municipal parks, playgrounds and swimming
pools for the colored. It is a defimte tax burden to be assumed
and will be increasingly so with litigation being instituted to
admit colored persons to state institutions or bring graduate
schools in colored schools up to a comparable level.
It is true that our minority races must have equal protection before the law as to life, limb and property In the main
this has been achieved at least theoretically-practically perhaps no, if 100% equality is the desired objective. Note that
lynchings which were formally considerable are now at a very
'Inter-racial Workshop, 916 N St. N.W., Washington, D. C.,
Congress of Racial Equality, 2929 Broadway, New York 25, N. Y.
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low ebb, not indicating that lawlessness has the upper hand in
the South.26 This is said with the firm conviction that the taking
of one life by mob violence is a crime against humanity and good
government. But there is something to be said for the southerners' proposal that picket-line violences, so common to our industrial sections, be included in the list of "mob" actions which
would be made a federal offense by proposed legislation or
should not, in justice, peace officers be penalized for failure to
use "diligent efforts" to solve any felony?
In reality it is submitted that there is no absolute equality
for man irrespective of his color or creed, and it has ever been
so. So long as there is property to be gained, power or prestige
to be wielded, and advantages of any nature to be attained in
public or private life, so will innate greed mitigate against the
forces that seek practical equality
Lest the writer be branded a pessimist, it might be well to
recognize that medical science has conquered heretofore so-called
incurable disease. The germ that flourishes in damp, dark and
hidden recesses often yields to the bright sunlight of day, as do
fear and intolerance yield to enlightenment.
It is true that penalty for murder does not erase the crime,
yet organized society must attempt to remove man-made barriers.
It is possible that legislation proposed in the civil rights program
is a step in the right direction if correctly drawn and judiciously
applied. However, aside from the fact that the South is trying to
put its own house in order, we entertain a serious doubt that we
are readv for such legislation at the present time.
One's neighbors may not have designs on his home, life or
purse and yet decline to invite him into their homes or sit with
hun in a public conveyance. Yet had he designs of sufficient intensity the home would be violated, the life endangered or the
purse lifted irrespective of statutory prohibitions. So it seems
that a legislative enactment will not bring about social equality
or commingling of our people.
-' Most correct data available show that lynching in 1942 totalled
6 negroes; 1943, 3 negroes; 1944, 2 negroes; 1945, 1 negro; 1946, 6
negroes. These figures contrast with a high, since 1900 of 105 lynchings of colored persons in 1901. It is of further significant interest
that since 1900 in the U.S. there have been lynchings of 1291 white
persons and 3408 negroes. (Figures from Natl. Assn. for adv. of colored people, 20 W 40th St., New York, N. Y., and World Almanac
1943.)
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We Americans have a sense of independence that rebels
against prohibitions, yet equally developed is a sense of fair play
and justice. It is believed that in time, the minority race can so
improve its position that even such diametrically opposed races
can live in harmony As an example, one might look to North
Carolina, southern both traditionally and geographically The
racial issue has ceased to be of any real consequence in that state.
Only three of its twelve representatives in Congress were among
seventy-four southerners who signed an ultimatum on the civil
rights program. Twenty-eight years ago the poll-tax was abolished as a qualification for voters in that state. Its record of
votes by both whites and negroes is high in comparison with that
of its neighbors. Surely what has happened in one southern state
can be brought about in another without agitation by federal
legislation.
No thinking person can aisregard the unsettled conditions
of the world today One truly looks upon the world political
situation with great misgivings at a time when the freedom seeking people of the world look to this country for guidance. Is it
not then a mistake to do that which stokes the fires of internal
dissension when our combined forces of thought and energy are
desperately needed in battle for what well may be the very sur
vival of democratic processes in the broader sense 9
The writer certainly does not have the answer to this momentous question which is a cornerstone to our political, social
and religious well being, and which has drawn the attention of
experts in the field.
However, it is sound counsel to consider the fact that we
should not become obsessed with an irritating skin rash while the
cancer of Communism eats at the vitals of our national existence,
or it may well be that we will have equality forced upon us in
that none has any rights, not even the right to clamour for them.

